The Tactics Thread

[Sasha]

Doesnt Allegri like to use a 4-3-1-2?

 

[ikita]

all of us here have an idea of what we need at the club for success again. the question is if B&G know what we need. or more specifically if they are willing to sacrifice for it?

 

[Congo Powers]

ive mentioned this strategy b4


----------------------gasol---------------
-------fw---------------------------fw-----
------------am---------------am------------
---------------------dm----------------------
---michael phelps---------------usain bolt-----
------------------cb-------cb------------------
-----------------------gk-------------------------

of course the water hoses are crucial on the left side

 

[Senatore_M84]

Ill do some research to confirm later MM. But allegris 4-3-1-2 was very versatilie. Because of cossu and lazzari. He was able to switch it to 442, 433 and 4222's depending. It was pretty fluid moving thru midfield. IMO if matri was more clinical they'd probably be pusing top 4.


Edit: well and a good backline

 

[ikita]

Ill do some research to confirm later MM. But allegris 4-3-1-2 was very versatilie. Because of cossu and lazzari. He was able to switch it to 442, 433 and 4222's depending. It was pretty fluid moving thru midfield. IMO if matri was more clinical they'd probably be pusing top 4.


Edit: well and a good backline

sounds pretty efficient rly. it'll be advantageous for us if he can utilise those formations. but it's problematic if our players aren't as versatile as he is. (King ronnie)

 

[Sven]

Looks like we will need to buy a playmaker.

 

[Pedro]

-A RB

Abate = RB
Antonini = RB and LB
Zambrotta = RB and LB
Bonera = RB and CB
Oddo = RB (might leave)
Jankulovski = will leave
Kaladze = will leave
Favalli = will leave

What about a LB instead of a RB?

 

[Christian]

Before I share my opinion I just want to say that I think rigid formations and tactics are exaggerated. What we all at times fail to acknowledge is that the opposition ultimately defines how most teams set up. I can think of only a handful of teams currently that do not care what the opposition does i.e. Barcelona. In most games you will see varying formations from any one team.

Don't agree that Barcelona doesn't change to fit their opposition. Maybe last season I could've somewhat agreed with you, but this season Guardiola has mixed it up quite a bit, the best example I can think off being the last game against Real Madrid, where he only played 2 'attackers' Pedro/Messi.

To go off topic - People talk about the demise of the no.10 but the lack of pure box to box midfielders is also a problem. I’ve never been a fan of players just sitting and holding in midfield, most of the elite teams have such good defenders they don’t need a guard to protect them at all times. Players like De Rossi and Essien are pure box to box midfielders but even they are shackled to just sit which is sad. They could offer so much more but the need for specialist players is ruining football.

Don't agree with this either. Given the fact that every team nowadays play with attacking fullbacks means that a pure holding midfielder becomes absolutly vital in most cases. We saw in the CL final what can happen when you don't have a pure holding midfielder and your defensive midfielder (Van Bommel) joins the attacks playing against 2 attackers.

In brazil they even go as far as to (Traditionaly) play 2 DM's to allow both their full backs to press forward. I think this is the reason they've always produced so many great attacking full backs, and it doesn't necessarely mean that they play less attacking football.

Ofcourse it all depends on how the other team plays imo. There should be no reason to keep more than the two CB's back if there's only 1 striker forward, but if there's two strikers forward I think you absolutly need to have 3 players back if you want to be safe.

Which brings me on to one of the problems with our current team, when Pato has been out injured. Since Ronaldinho/Borriello and the third attacker, are all not helping defend, you'd think that the gain in that would be that they could all get in to space, so that as soon as we got the ball back, we'd be lethal on the counter. But the fact is that without Pato, we've been absolutly terrible on the counter, which makes me think, what's the point in having our front three just wander around?

I guess my point is just, that I don't necessarly think that we'd need to have all our attackers chase down the ball all the time on our half. But if they don't do that, then they better be lethal on the counter, so they either 1: Score goals, or 2: tie down the fullbacks/Dm's etc.

 

[ikita]

Looks like we will need to buy a playmaker.

i hope to God that we do get a true playmaker this summer. i think it would be incredible to sign that Hazard dude. People have said that he can play at a high level of football despite being only 19.

 

[Ashish]

can anyone unleash thiago silvas atttacking potential he is a dynamite if used properly he can go down as one of the greats, he reminds me of baresi(youtube ) i heard baresi spoke highly about him if only he was 1/10 what franco was

 

[Sonny.Bill.Williams]

way forward:
Dinho has to ditch the Diagonal ball on every attack...+ he has to move ,i mean how many times has dinho gotten behind the defence with his runs??? Borri has + pato countless times +pippo always does .....so isnt it a case of Dinho not moving and since most of the ball ends up at his feet he only has 2-3 players moving (pato/borri/seedorf) and three defenders marking them plus backtracking midfielders ....we cant commit pirlo because there is no cover for the LB in antons case and we cant commit ambro because who is gonna cover for pirlo(thats sad) .......+ when dinho gets the ball he is right up against the touchline and the only way to get anton behind the defence is to go back in midfield to seerdof( 2 men in the box now) and then a pass to anton,anton crosses to two people against a GK + 3 defenders ....end move and so it continues..... and so comes my question why did dinho have to be the focal point when we have pirlo and Dorf who can pick a pass as well as anyone......+ we will still have two at the back
---------------Dorf/Pirlo--------
----------Ambro------Flamini----
and more importantly 3 vs 4 at the front and gives more freedom to our WB's to get behind the def and we are in fact left with a 6-1-3----its what barca do(except that they use there rb and so the lb-Abidal stays back) and we can do it on our right with anton ..and if we have a solid defensive Lb which seems to be the case with otamendi he could be part of our three man attacking defence with the cdm moving up to cm and cm mving to join the flank

----Lw--------Cf---------Rw--
--Lb/CM--------Cam/treq-------rb--
--------------Cm/CDM--------------
----LB/CB--------CB/Cdm---------CB
--------------GK--------------

so in essence we only need a solid Lb ...anton can cover for injuries but he cant cross with his left......and two midfielders one cm and cdm........the cm needs to be box to box and thats where i think flamini's true place is we need some one is good in the air as a cdm because i dont want our cbs challenging for the ball and resulting in a knock down al la milito so i'd love to have T.Silva as a CDM and back up for him...would ideally be Javi martinez ,who in fact is a cm but could do the job at CDM and then a Cm like lazzari would be awesome ....couple that with a better Lw or dinho with movement we'd be solid enough to be competetive and barring injuries be potential winners

 

[Az.]

near perfect post Az near perfect post, analysed to make us a team.
precisely god precisely

s striker to destroy offense so that dinho and pato can have free license to riot

box to box cm so that flamini can destroy plays and pirlo/seedorf can dictate and be lazy for a while

Nesta is done, if he comes back its a bonus he cant be risked cause he is invaluable.

and a full back

again perfect post

Alves as goal keeper

Thanks mate.Yeah Alves would have been better but we dont really have the cash for a new gk .

I'm against stick to an unique tatic. It's impossible that the same tatics will be the answer to every game. That's my biggest criticism of Leo, he couldn't made anything else work this season, and when the 4-3-3 doesn't worked, there was no other plan.

First of all the 4-3-3 didn't work at times this season cause key players were missing from the team.(Pato&Nesta)Leo had very little resources at his disposal ,he couldn't adapt more because there was nothing more to adapt to.

His biggest flaw was that he didn't quite figure out when to sub in the right players.Sticking to a unique tactic especially when next season we can only revamp the first 11 is not a bad idea at all.

If something is not broken there`s no need to fix it.

Abate = RB
Antonini = RB and LB
Zambrotta = RB and LB
Bonera = RB and CB
Oddo = RB (might leave)
Jankulovski = will leave
Kaladze = will leave
Favalli = will leave

What about a LB instead of a RB?

Dont think you read all my post but in short : Abate /Zambrotta/Bonera/Oddo are not good enough to be right backs.Abate &Bonera are back up materials at best .

Antonini`s best position is on the left,we should not mess with that.It works ,it works well there`s no need to experiment and move him on the right ,were he proved decent.(decent is not good enough)

We need to invest in a new starter RB.

 

[Senatore_M84]

sounds pretty efficient rly. it'll be advantageous for us if he can utilise those formations. but it's problematic if our players aren't as versatile as he is. (King ronnie)

yes. All we need is schweinstagger and david silva (and maybe de rossi) and we can play it.

silva
schweini--pirlo--de rossi

schweini--pirlo--de rossi--silva​

[/awkward wet dream]


but seriously.... cagliari's midfield was pretty versatile. Cossu was RW/CAM. Lazzari is a CAM/CM, Biondini was generally CDM but more of a box to box CM in reality. Dessena could play anywhere along the midfield. Jeda even played some in midfield though almost always forward.. Lots of flexibility in the system. Reminded me of poor man's version of rui costa, pirlo, seedorf, gattuso. where they all could shift interchangeably (well except gattuso)

The major problems cagliari had tactically where lack of clinical finishing from particularly Matri who played all 38 games and scored 13 goals (3 penalties... though to be far, he did get some assists). Combine... matri, jeda and nene (main forwards) scored only 29 goals... 6 of which were penalties. 27 of there goals came from midfield, probably largely due to movement of midfield, which is plus of allegri's tactic. People wanna praise Matri and claim he's better than Borriello but make no mistake... lazzari, cossu and rest of midfield was reason that team was good. They created A LOT for him

The other major problem is there backline was awful including marchetti playing poorly. Astori MIGHT have been there best defender but as a hwole they allowed 58 goals which is terrible

 

[dev1L]

milan - rm
united - milan

some analyses but it's in italian..

http://www.allenatore.net/dinamiche..._utente=23765&file=studios~233~milan-real.pdf

http://www.allenatore.net/dinamiche...tente=23765&file=studios~243~manutd_milan.pdf

 

[Senatore_M84]

Taken from an exert from match analysis of palermo win over milan, kind of demonstrating point i made page pack about xmas tree and kaka/rui behind sheva.

Milan got back into the game with a well-worked goal finished by Clarence Seedorf. Notice how Milan negate Palermo’s marking responsibilities that worked so well in the first half. Rather than placing himself up against Bovo, the left-sided centre-back, Huntelaar instead stands next to Kjaer, the right centre-back, meaning Ronaldinho is left free in front of the defence. Bovo is then the free man and has to come to meet Ronaldinho – which leaves space in the centre of the defence that Seedorf exploits, turning sharper than Liverani and finishing nearly. The only bright spot of a terrible Milan performance, but it demonstrates how the Christmas Tree can unlock opposition defences by playing two players ‘in the hole’.

It's all great if we can secure a class CF, but I'm not entirely convinced it's best means of action for ronaldinho and pato. While pato and a guy like Dzeko would be great partnership, it's probably best suited with a true #10 behind them...

consistently, maybe the xmas tree is best way to go and finding another 'in the hole' player who is more active/dynamic than seedorf is way to go. Love Clarence but at this point in his career unless he's playing in the hole behind 2 super dynamic players, it's just too stale an attack on a consistent basis. Ronaldinho is not that dynamic in terms of movement.

What I'm talking bout is a guy like Del Piero in his prime (pre injury). Jovetic is first guy that comes in my head, but Robinho would work too (though i haven't seen him on right as much.)

 

[ikita]

yes. All we need is schweinstagger and david silva (and maybe de rossi) and we can play it.

silva
schweini--pirlo--de rossi

schweini--pirlo--de rossi--silva​

[/awkward wet dream]


but seriously.... cagliari's midfield was pretty versatile. Cossu was RW/CAM. Lazzari is a CAM/CM, Biondini was generally CDM but more of a box to box CM in reality. Dessena could play anywhere along the midfield. Jeda even played some in midfield though almost always forward.. Lots of flexibility in the system. Reminded me of poor man's version of rui costa, pirlo, seedorf, gattuso. where they all could shift interchangeably (well except gattuso)

The major problems cagliari had tactically where lack of clinical finishing from particularly Matri who played all 38 games and scored 13 goals (3 penalties... though to be far, he did get some assists). Combine... matri, jeda and nene (main forwards) scored only 29 goals... 6 of which were penalties. 27 of there goals came from midfield, probably largely due to movement of midfield, which is plus of allegri's tactic. People wanna praise Matri and claim he's better than Borriello but make no mistake... lazzari, cossu and rest of midfield was reason that team was good. They created A LOT for him

The other major problem is there backline was awful including marchetti playing poorly. Astori MIGHT have been there best defender but as a hwole they allowed 58 goals which is terrible

the only way i see our team being able to be as versatile as the cagliari players were but remain superior to them is if our players were young. i'm sure players like Flamini can adapt easier to a change of role/tactics faster than seedorf. younger players have greater stamina, strength and a sense of wanting to lend themselves to the game. Look at what Leonardo did to Abate. people claim that he wasn't good defensively, but he was able to adapt to the different position and still retain his natural midfield qualities for the attack, the main part of the gameplay that Leonardo focused on. another thing is that our players would have to be generally well trained in all areas of footballing skill to be able to be versatile to begin with. box-to-box midfielders would have to have substantial defensive capacities and most of all the will to want to defend, and vice-versa for natural DMs. same goes for our attacking players. if different skills can overlap onto different players, it would allow them to play out of their position when needed but only when needed. if they get carried away, it's impossible to keep it together. can old dogs learn new tricks? In our case switching from 4-3-1-2, to 4-3-2-1, to 4-2-2-2, to 4-2-3-1 requires them to. but that's exceptionally in our case where the average age of our team is 30.

I'm never happy​

 

[Sonny.Bill.Williams]

Was wondering if teams that expect to face deep lying- men behind the ball -defenses like Spain and Brazil...etc wouldn't they be better off giving the ball away and then countering???.....typical example with Spain yesterday...this does depend on the team of course ...whether they are content with the draw.......but like the swiss showed some attacking intent....I felt the best chances for Spain came from counter(Torres-villa through ball etc) and they need to give up the ball to score...what do you guys think??

 

[Jasper]

Was wondering if teams that expect to face deep lying- men behind the ball -defenses like Spain and Brazil...etc wouldn't they be better off giving the ball away and then countering???.....typical example with Spain yesterday...this does depend on the team of course ...whether they are content with the draw.......but like the swiss showed some attacking intent....I felt the best chances for Spain came from counter(Torres-villa through ball etc) and they need to give up the ball to score...what do you guys think??

This is super simplistic. First of all these are technical teams that enjoy being with the ball(no matter what can be said about Dunga's Brazil I doubt they have the drill to run without the ball as much as weaker or defending expert teams). Secondly it's not that easy to pull off counter-attack game as you make it sound. Just because you give the ball away doesn't mean you will have a chance for counter-attack. For example I don't think Swiss would have thrown numbers to Spain's half. They would have tried to go with 4 men straight forward like they did. Thirdly if big guns like Brazil, Spain or other big nations start to throw the ball away and sit back the opposition will gladly stay pu and take the draw.

 

[Sonny.Bill.Williams]

This is super simplistic. First of all these are technical teams that enjoy being with the ball(no matter what can be said about Dunga's Brazil I doubt they have the drill to run without the ball as much as weaker or defending expert teams)..

Obviously im not saying they should do without it from the start...try to break them down and then towards the latter stages of the 1st and begining of 2nd let them have it and put men behind the ball and wait for them to come and counter

Secondly it's not that easy to pull off counter-attack game as you make it sound. Just because you give the ball away doesn't mean you will have a chance for counter-attack. For example I don't think Swiss would have thrown numbers to Spain's half. They would have tried to go with 4 men straight forward like they did..

Like i said it depends on the team you come up against ......and i think the mentality is bound to change from the first round to the next...people will be forced to attack (unless they want PK's which is a lottery in itself ) I'm just basing this on what inter did to Barca ...you posted an article a while ago....i think they way Spain can progress and become better is if they give up so much pos. when they are faced with a well organized defence ...because they commit so much players forward a swift counter can always be their undoing ....inter barca....it's likely that if spain vs Brazil in the 2nd round brazil could do the same

Thirdly if big guns like Brazil, Spain or other big nations start to throw the ball away and sit back the opposition will gladly stay pu and take the draw.

true but im saying they have to give up more not all ...and again mentality of teams will determine if they attack or not ...+ most teams spread their FB's and midfielders move forward or make runs which leaves more space up front and then there wont be 10men behind the ball most of the time as we've seen lately

Its in actual fact giving a team a gameplan to play when they didn't plan for .....i dont know if that makes sense

 

[Jasper]

The Question: What have been the tactical lessons of World Cup 2010?

Spain have adopted the Barcelona formula, which seems to be the way club football is going

Carles Puyol Spain's Carles Puyol, centre, celebrates with team-mates after scoring against Germany during their 2010 World Cup semi-final. Photograph: David Gray/Reuters

This has been the tournament of 4-2-3-1. The move has been apparent in club football for some time; in fact, it may be that 4-2-3-1 is beginning to be supplanted by variants of 4-3-3 at club level, but international football these days lags behind the club game, and this tournament has confirmed the trend that began to emerge at Euro 2008. Even Michael Owen seems to have noticed, which is surely the tipping point.

Formations, though, are one thing, their employment something else, and what has been noticeable in South Africa has been the vast range of 4-2-3-1s. Spain, when they finally adopted it against Germany, and stopped trying to squeeze Fernando Torres and David Villa into the same side, fiddled with the line of three, pulling Xavi back and pushing Andrés Iniesta and Pedro forward so it almost becomes 4-2-1-3, which seems to be the route club football is taking. It has had very attacking full-backs and has pressed high up the pitch, essentially using the Barcelona formula.

There are those who protest at their lack of goals (no side has reached the final scoring fewer) but they are a classic example of a team that prefers to control the game than to become obsessed by creating chances. Perhaps they at times become mesmerised by their passing, perhaps there is even something attritional about it, wearing opponents down until they make the mistake, but it is beautiful attrition. Those who have protested at the modern Holland, and their supposed betrayal of the heritage of Total Football, which is being painted as the ne plus ultra of attacking football, should perhaps look back at the European Cup finals of 1971-73 when Ajax expressed their mastery by holding the ball for long periods. Frankly, if they ever faced a side who took them on rather than sitting eight men behind the ball, we may see a more overtly attacking Spain.

Which brings us to Germany. They too play a 4-2-3-1 and, although Philipp Lahm breaks forward occasionally, theirs is essentially a defensive set-up. Here again goals are the great betrayers; it was bewildering how much praise was heaped on their supposedly fresh, open approach just because they scored four goals in three games. This Germany was superb on the counterattack, and the interaction of the front four of Miroslav Klose, Thomas Müller, Lukas Podolski and Mesut Ozil was at times breathtaking. But this was reactive football.

In three games, Germany scored an early first goal – against Argentina and England, it was essentially handed to them – and in those games they ruthlessly took advantage of the space opponents left behind them as they chased an equaliser. England, Argentina and Australia all defended idiotically against them, and were severely punished. In the other three games, teams defended decently against them and the early goal didn't arrive surrounded by watercress on a silver salver. In those games Germany managed one goal, and that a wonder-strike from Ozil. Against Spain their poverty of ideas was such they ended up sending the lumbering centre-back Per Mertesacker forward as an auxiliary striker, an idea so bereft of subtlety that the only time I remember it working was when Dennis Smith once sent Gary Bennett forward for Sunderland against Oxford in 1990.

Reactivity, in fact, has been a feature of this World Cup, which is one of the reasons the proactivity of Spain is so welcome. It's probably too early to highlight it as a definite trend, for the world seemed headed in a similar direction in 2004 when José Mourinho's Porto won the Champions League and Greece won the European Championship, only for attacking football to return the next season, but with Mourinho's success with Inter, it may be that the great creative boom of the past decade is drawing to a close.

Holland and Argentina both effectively played broken teams, the former in a 4-2-3-1, the latter in a 4-3-1-2. Certain players were clearly designated to defend, others to attack, with very little to link them. The allure of the approach is understandable, for with the limited time available to managers it is difficult to develop sophisticated systems (Spain benefit from the fact that so many of their players play for the same club, and that they have essentially played the same way, with minor evolution, for four years), and simplification is desirable.

It can be effective, and the way Nigel de Jong and Mark van Bommel have protected Holland's shaky back four has been admirable, but it can render a team static and reliant on the ability of a couple of individuals (Arjen Robben and Wesley Sneijder; Lionel Messi and Carlos Tevez). And if the forwards do no tracking back at all the system can very easily be unsettled by a breaker from midfield, as for instance Bastian Schweinsteiger showed against Argentina.

Even Brazil had an element of reactivity about them, often sitting deep, pressing only when the opponent had crossed halfway, and then hitting the space behind them. They played an angled 4-2-3-1 that had the advantage of getting Robinho into an area other 4-2-3-1s found difficult to counteract. Although they capitulated miserably in the second half against Holland, and although they have an utter disregard for the samba stereotype, they have been arguably the strongest side in the world over the past four years, winning the Copa América, the Confederations Cup and finishing top of Conmebol qualifying. That they and Spain never met feels like one of the great missed games.

Then there was Ghana's 4-2-3-1, with the five midfielders packed deep and Asamoah Gyan the lonest of lone strikers, only in bursts breaking free with the sort of passing that suggests they might actually be a force in years to come. Japan played a 4-2-3-1 with a false nine, almost embracing their historical lack of midfield flair (and no, two free-kicks, brilliant as they were, plus a goal on the break against Denmark doesn't suddenly make them a creative force, even if Keisuke Honda offers great hope for the future).

The rise of 4-2-3-1 has had knock-on effects. Attacking full-backs have become rarer – and the difference in attitude of the respective pairs of full-back is arguably the major difference between the two 4-2-3-1s that will meet in the final. It had seemed that the advance of lone-central-striker systems would spell the end for three at the back, for who needed two spare men? Well, it turns out that teams intent merely on surviving, playing for goalless draws, do, and that's what Uruguay did against France, North Korea did against Brazil, and New Zealand did on a regular basis.

Again, that suggests a preparedness to absorb pressure that it's hard to believe wasn't in some way, if not inspired then at least encouraged, by Inter's success in Barcelona. There was evidence that a technically inferior side could, though discipline and industry, endure a prolonged assault. It is that same battle between proactivity and reactivity that will be fought on Sunday; and for once, it is the Dutch who find themselves cast as the destructive force.


http://www.guardian.co.uk/sport/blog/2010/jul/09/world-cup-2010-tactics-the-question

 

[crazy4milan]

Frankly, if they ever faced a side who took them on rather than sitting eight men behind the ball, we may see a more overtly attacking Spain.

BS. Chile sit eight men behind the ball? I know that and the game vs Honduras were the only ones were they scored 2...but let's put it this way, Chile happily attacked their defense, then got one, then got another, Torres fell down, red card for Chile player, Chile then started the second half with obvious intentions to try to win the game in case Switzerland beat Honduras, goal Chile. And what does Spain do for the rest of the game? Pass the ball in their own half.

Also BS cause Paraguay didn't do anything different to what Spain did in that game...they pressured the midfield, thus got away with creating lots of chances (eventually scored a goal and missed a pk). If Paraguay would've sit 8 men behind the ball it wouldn't have worked.

Germany didn't do that...I'm not sure what they did, but they didn't sit 8 men behind the ball (and quite frankly had they done it, I'm pretty sure Spain wouldn't have gotten away with it). Also don't believe Holland did it. Honduras certainly didn't hence why Spain could've score 3 more in that game.

Eitherway it's nothing wrong with it, so Spain didn't faced as many 2nd tier european nts that bend over to get a 6-0, big deal, they turn effective, and used a very good new defensive system, where passing the ball and wearing out the other team is more important than looking for a goal (and it was ok for them to do that cause any time there was a threat for their CBs they didn't look too good).

B] OptaJoe[/B]
66 - Spain scored fewer goals (8), had fewer shots on target (35) & a lower conversion rate (8.1%) than any #worldcup winner since '66. Lows [/I]

This certainly helps my point I believe.

 

[Senatore_M84]

so sick of the 4-2-3-1. For me most tactically interesting sides of world cup were:

Spain when they played that 4-2-2-2 (4cm possession) with torres and villa

Uruguays old school 4-3-1-2

Mexico-s 3-4-3/4-3-3
and Chile's 3-3-1-3/4-3-3/3-4-3 whatever it was


Eitherway Uruguay's goal v. Mexico epitmize perfect 4-3-1-2



#10 feeding #7 striker who drifts wide to cross to #9. Reminds me of some kaka/rui costa to sheva to pippo stuff

 

[Jasper]

The Question: Could the sweeper be on his way back?

Terry Butcher of England England's Terry Butcher, left, keeps an eye on Olaf Thon during the 1990 World Cup semi-final. The match ended in a 1-1 draw, with the Germans famously winning 4-3 on penalties Photograph: David Cannon/Getty Images

The history of tactics is the history of the manipulation of space. Space is created – or emerges – for one player, and he begins to have a disproportionate influence on the game. Then a way is found to block him, and in turn space will appear somewhere else on the pitch.

As the centre-half became a centre-back in the 20s, so the inside-forwards had to drop deep to cover the space he left in midfield. The withdrawn centre-forward terrorised sides in the 50s, and so by the 60s the holding midfielder had been developed to counter him.

More recently, the attacking full-back has become increasingly important. Ashley Cole's performance for Chelsea on Sunday showed exactly the damage such a player can cause if he can dominate an essentially attacking wide midfielder – Aaron Lennon in this case – and then exploit his lack of defensive ability. Their rise, as predicted by Jack Charlton after the 1994 World Cup, stems from the fact that when 4–4–2 meets 4–4–2, they are the only players on the pitch with space in front of them, as centre-backs pick up centre-forwards and four-man midfields tend to cancel each other out.

In turn, that has promoted the use of defensive forwards to block them, which is a natural consequence of the modern preference for the 4–3–3 or 4–2–3–1. Using only one central attacking presence with a midfield platform allows teams to push their wide players higher up the field, and that cuts down the space that initially encouraged the full-backs to maraud.

The modern game's key contest

In a number of games recently the key contest has been that between full-back and wide attacker. When England won 4-1 in Zagreb, for instance, Fabio Capello's use of Theo Walcott high on the right exposed the defensive shortcomings of the Croatia left-back Danijel Pranjic, and prevented him surging forward to provide an overlap for Ivan Rakitic, the left-sided midfielder, as he cut infield. That Walcott then scored a hat-trick was almost a bonus.

The Euro 2008 semi-final was fairly even for 34 minutes, until David Villa was injured. On came Cesc Fábregas, Spain changed shape from 4–1–3–2 to 4–1–4–1, and the two Russian full-backs, Alexander Anyukov and Yuri Zhirkov, who had been getting forward, found themselves with a direct opponent against whom they had to defend. Russia lost their attacking thrust, Spain came to dominate both territory and possession, and ended up winning 3-0.

Manchester United's 0-0 draw away to Internazionale in the Champions League second round last season was achieved, at least in part, because of the way Park Ji-sung negated Maicon as an attacking threat. Similarly in the quarter-final, after Aly Cissokho, Porto's left-back, had repeatedly surged by Cristiano Ronaldo in the 2–2 draw in the first leg at Old Trafford, Sir Alex Ferguson stymied him at the Dragao by deploying Wayne Rooney on the right and Ronaldo at centre-forward.

Whether United will continue to be so effective at stopping attacking full-backs following their shift back to 4–4–2 remains to be seen. Certainly Park, usually so effective in such a role, didn't really get to grips with Ashley Cole during the Community Shield. Nonetheless there is no reason to believe that those skirmishes in wide areas will not continue to be a key part of the battle, particularly if the trend for "false nines" – that is, centre-forwards who drop deep, as Francesco Totti did for Roma three seasons ago, Ronaldo and Carlos Tevez did for Manchester United two seasons ago, and Leo Messi did for Barcelona last season – continues.

The wide forward, more dangerous than in the middle

Already other effects are beginning to be seen that hint at what the future may hold. The question is always where is the space, and two trends have begun to emerge. The first involves the wide forwards. If they are tight against the full-back high up the field, there is no space, but if they drop deeper, whether the full-back follows or not, space is opened on the diagonal in to goal.

In a sense, there is nothing new to that realisation, for it was that space that Italian forwards exploited in il gioco all'Italiano, when it was common for one of the two centre-forwards to operate to the left, being picked up by the opposing right-back, while the left-back was more attacking (it remains one of football's curious constants that good attacking left-backs are far more common than good attacking right-backs).

But it is intriguing to see it reapplied and reinterpreted, whether by Robinho in Brazil's 4–2–3–1, or by the likes of Ronaldo, Messi and Thierry Henry, all of whom have been prolific in recent seasons. "When forwards attack from wide to inside, they are far more dangerous," Ferguson said last season.

"It's funny when I see centre-forwards starting off in the middle against their markers and then going away from goal. Strikers going inside are far more dangerous, I think. When Henry played as a striker, and sometimes when Wayne does, they try to escape and create space by drifting from the centre to wide positions, when that actually makes them less dangerous."

Space for the centre-backs

But looking further ahead, there is also another player who has space, and that is one of the centre-backs. A single central striker is marked by one central defender, leaving the other one as a spare man. Of course that is useful defensively, but there is no reason why the extra player should only be useful defensively. After all, when 4–4–2 met 4–4–2 two central defenders picked up two centre-forwards and nobody worried about having additional cover (with the slight caveat that full-backs, without a wide player playing high against them, could drift inside to provide some cover). Why shouldn't that extra defender stride forward into midfield as the likes of Franz Beckenbauer and Ruud Krol once did?

The classic liberi had disappeared by the early 80s, but even in 3–5–2 there was an expectation that the sweeper would step forward and become an extra man in midfield.

Klaus Augenthaler, for instance, twice wandered forward to hit long range drives for West Germany in the 1990 World Cup semi-final, and so giddy were England with the possibilities of a formation they had only just adopted that Terry Butcher, deployed as libero in that game because Bobby Robson was concerned Jürgen Klinsmann or Rudi Völler would exploit his lack of pace if he were used as a marker, attempted a backheel in the centre-circle.

The 3–5–2 formation has fallen into disuse because of the prevalence of single-central-striker formations. With only one forward to mark, two of the centre-backs are left as spare men, which effectively leaves one redundant. With the wing-backs picking up the opposing wide men, that curtails the width of the side playing 3–5–2 and almost certainly gives their opponents' full-backs free reign.

But that does not invalidate the central point of using three-centre-backs, which was to leave one spare. Whether it's three on two or two on one, there is one player left free, and it seems only logical that the new libero should begin to act as the old libero did. Attackers are increasingly been called upon to defend; it seems that defenders will be increasingly be called upon to attack.


http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/blog/2009/sep/22/football-tactics-trends

__________

With Milan we saw in many games how teams cancelled each other out. And then Thiago Silva was given all the space and he made runs forward. Lucio does it as well but he tends to pick the time more from his instinct than from what his team needs IMO.

 

[Jasper]

Is the sweeper set for a return to prominence?
April 22, 2010

Jonathan Wilson recently wrote in his excellent ‘The Question’ series about the possibility of the return of the sweeper to football. The sweeper prospered as the ’spare man’ in a three-man central defence up against a two-man attack, so now we have two-man central defences up against one-man attacks, should one centre-back not become a sweeper?

The idea is music to the ears of anyone who fondly remembers Euro 96. The player of the tournament was Matthias Sammer, the sweeper in the German 3-4-1-2 system that went onto win the tournament. As well as being the most important player in defence, clearing up behind the two markers, he also had license to go forward and launch attacks, and found himself scoring (in open play) on more than one occasion.

Perhaps the German success at Euro 96 was what sparked the brief mid-late 90s obsession with three-man defences in England, but they are currently a thing of the past across most of Europe, and certainly in the Premiership.

So, against a lone striker, one of the centre-backs in theory has a license to attack. This has been the case at Arsenal this season, where William Gallas and Thomas Vermaelen often charge forward. It was also demonstrated in the first leg of the Bayern Munich v Manchester United tie, where centre-back Martin Demichelis stepped forward into the midfield. Sir Alex Ferguson’s introduction of Dimitar Berbatov was thought by some to be primarily to prevent the Argentine doing so.

But the reality is that it is suicidal to leave your defence equipped with just one centre-back (see Vermaelen’s error in Arsenal’s defeat to Manchester United earlier this year), particularly if the opposing striker is faster than him and able to move wide before outpacing his marker to the ball. Considering how popular one-striker formations are today, it is still extremely rare to see a centre-back constantly looking to power forward to bolster the midfield – it is simply too risky.

And so it is likely that the equivalent of a sweeper in future years will be a defensive midfielder dropping into the backline – with the centre-backs moving wide – rather than a centre-back pushing forward into the midfield. On this site, we have referred to this player as a centre-half (see Carsten Ramelow at Bayer Leverkusen, for example), such is the similarity in its nature to the ‘original’ centre-half, who permanently moved from the centre of midfield to the centre of defence.

The advantages? It widens the active playing area at both ends of the pitch, making it easier to keep possession, and tougher for the opposition to cover the space. It also creates a difficult situation for the opposition in terms of picking up players.

There are two interesting modern examples of this in action – and tellingly, they involve the best club side in the world, and (possibly) the best international side in the world.

Barcelona have played a system for the past two seasons where the deepest midfield player (either Yaya Toure or Sergio Busquets) drops into the centre of defence, with the centre-backs, Gerard Pique and Carles Puyol, spreading into extremely wide positions whilst Barcelona are in possession, almost on the touchlines. This allows Dani Alves and Eric Abidal/Maxwell, the full-backs, to bomb forward without fear of leaving the defence completely exposed.

Similarly, Brazil’s shape sees Gilberto Silva dropping into the defence (either in the centre of the two centre-backs, or to the right), allowing Maicon and Michel Bastos forward.

How a four-man defence evolves into a three-man defence

This diagram on the right shows how a switch from a four to a three-man defence when in possession can outwit the opposition. The problem with attacking full-backs at the moment is that they are never completely free to attack, they are always concerned about their defensive responsibilities, especially with the tendency for sides to deploy their most creative players as wingers. With a more reliable three-man defence, they can get to the opposition byline without leaving a huge hole at the back.

A big part of the switch is the role of the wide players on the Yellow side. Rather than stay wide (which would hamper the ability of the full-backs to get forward), they narrow and become almost a conventional front three. This has the effect of narrowing the opposition defence, as their natural markers (the White full-backs) follow them into the centre.

Of course, this opens up a huge amount of space on the flanks, which the full-backs can exploit. This presents a further problem for the Whites, as their wide midfield players are suddenly charged with almost a solely defensive job. If the Yellow full-backs get to the byline and the White wide midfielders track them all the way, the Whites will end up with something approaching a flat back six.

Furthermore, the evolved shape makes it relatively easy for the Yellows to keep possession – the three defenders and holding midfielder should be able to play their way around the two White strikers at the back.

So the advantages can be summarized as:

a) It allows the full-backs freedom to join the attack knowing the defence is covered

b) It makes keeping possession in defence easier

c) It stretches the play high up the pitch

d) If the opposition are playing creative players in wide areas, the centre-backs will be in a position to pick them up immediately.

e) It results in a system with three central forwards, an obvious goal threat

f) The opposition will be confused about who to pick up in wide areas

So, in theory, this system should work extremely well against a two-man attack, although it might face similar problems as the traditional three-man defence against one-man/three-man attacks. But the difference comes because the traditional three-man defence is a completely different system to the traditional four-man defence, which necessitates a different way of defending, and most likely a different selection of players. These shifts, as shown here by Brazil and Barcelona, are more flexible, and happen within games, rather than them lining up specifically like this. The system doesn’t have to shift against one- or three-man attacks, and therefore is free to adapt into a three-man defence when required, and stay as a four-man defence when that is more appropriate.

Alex Song, a future centre-half?

So what qualities would this modern sweeper, or modern centre-half, need? They would have to be a good reader of the game, an excellent passer (especially over long distances), a decent tackler and competent in the air, so they were not targeted when up against a tall striker. In other words, exactly the same as the old-style sweeper, and it is no coincidence that many of the more prominent examples of sweepers – Sammer, Lothar Matthuas, Ruud Gullit – were central midfielders earlier in their career.

Perhaps the most convincing case for their imminent reintroduction is the fact that most top Premiership clubs already have players who match the above description. Arsenal have Alex Song, Manchester United have Michael Carrick, Chelsea have Jon Obi Mikel, Manchester City have Gareth Barry or Vincent Kompany, Tottenham have Tom Huddlestone – all of whom would be comfortable dropping back to allow the full-backs to venture forward.

Of course, you also need certain types of players in other positions on the pitch. Your centre-backs must be good on the ball, your full-backs must have both pace and stamina, and your wide players must be comfortable drifting into the centre. Not all top-level clubs can boast these players, but football is certainly heading this way on all three counts.

If Brazil use this system on their way to winning the

http://www.zonalmarking.net/2010/04/22/is-the-sweeper-set-for-a-return-to-prominence/ - worth checking as I didn't bother to link all of the other stories his built this article.

 

[Senatore_M84]

yeah i liked that article jasper.

what are your thoughts on ambrosini converting into that role? Lining up as a 4-3-1-2 but as fb's push up he tends to drop back to a side cb, thiago silva on other and nesta @sweeper making a 3-4-1-2

I think Ambrosini is capable. For me, the times he plays poor are largely do to 'doing too much' if you follow. Trying to overexert and being a wild man. When he plays a discipline role he's excellent

 

[Sonny.Bill.Williams]

Thats what i've been saying ....imagine T.Silva being employed as a sweeper....yet i was greeted by "3 man midfields are suicide " .....i really believe we can get the best of our squad as is lining up in a 5-3-2 fashion and then changing into 3-1-3-3..with the width created by two of the front three and the fullbacks ....would love to see him try it Vs a team this preseason

 

[Jasper]

yeah i liked that article jasper.

what are your thoughts on ambrosini converting into that role? Lining up as a 4-3-1-2 but as fb's push up he tends to drop back to a side cb, thiago silva on other and nesta @sweeper making a 3-4-1-2

Interesting. First we would need fullbacks though. Trequartistas would have much room that way ... Sneijder would keep on murdering us.

I think Ambrosini is capable. For me, the times he plays poor are largely do to 'doing too much' if you follow. Trying to overexert and being a wild man. When he plays a discipline role he's excellent

Well, Ambro and Thiago definetly fit the skill-pack needed/described. But I don't feel really comfortable about 3 man defence and honestly I don't have enough imagination/info how the 3-man defence operates.

But sweeper role ... it needs a super-intelligent player. Quick in mind as Baresi said about himself. Don't think Ambro would handle that. Thiago shows intelligence with his runs IMO. They're timed perfectly. But don't know how he would in that role. Maybe I'm little skeptical because Thiago is a perfect CB and I wouldn't want to waste him in another role. You definetly need 2 good CBs in 3-man defence ... any defece really.

 

[Calum1903]

The next person who tells me that 4-2-3-1 is "the only formation they would ever consider playing" is getting a fucking slap. Especially if they then go on to tell me that they "hate" 4-5-1 and 4-3-3. These are just fucking numbers, and if people can't see the overlap between these formations in the real, non-Football Manager world, they don't deserve either football or vocal chords, to be frank.

 

[Sven]

The next person who tells me that 4-2-3-1 is "the only formation they would ever consider playing" is getting a fucking slap. Especially if they then go on to tell me that they "hate" 4-5-1 and 4-3-3. These are just fucking numbers, and if people can't see the overlap between these formations in the real, non-Football Manager world, they don't deserve either football or vocal chords, to be frank.

Here in Brazil 4-2-3-1 is called 4-5-1.

edit: I know this is the useless post ever

 

[Calum1903]

Here in Brazil 4-2-3-1 is called 4-5-1.

edit: I know this is the useless post ever

No post that supports my point is ever useless.